Digitization has drastically lowered the costs of replicating and distributing music, enabling piracy on the demand side, as well as supply side re-use and recontextualization. This paper examines cumulative creativity and re-use through the release of derivative works in the popular music industry. Combining novel data on "digital sampling" and cover songs with a new proprietary Spotify data-set tracking online music streaming, I study how the introduction of a derivative work impacts the market for the underlying good upon which it is based. With my data-set covering 11,682 artists and their daily streaming demand between 2015 and 2016, I utilize a matched-sample difference-in-differences estimator to find that, on average, re-use causes a 3% increase in demand for the treated artists. This effect is significantly mediated by prominence -with the effect neutralized for highly prominent artists, while artists of low prominence have a larger 6% boost in listening. Novel re-uses of artists that have not been subject to extensive past re-use appear to have the largest effect, resulting in an average 15% increase in online streaming. These results highlight an advertising effect of re-use, suggest that derivative works have limited ex post competition with upstream works, and point toward the potential benefits of permissive intellectual property rights licensing.
Introduction
song are re-used in a new recording of the song. I link this data with a proprietary panel data-set from Spotify, an online music streaming platform, that tracks daily streaming, or "listens," to each artist in my data. With the maintained assumption that the precise timing of re-use is exogenous once conditioned on observable characteristics, I employ a matchedsample difference-in-differences design, matching each re-used artist to an observably similar "control" artist based upon both time variant and time invariant features. With this data and research design, I am able to causally estimate how the release and distribution of a new song incorporating existing work affects demand for the underlying good upon which it is based, as measured through online listening. I find that, on average, re-use by a downstream artist induces a positive impact on the upstream (re-used) artist. In an unmatched sample, the release of a derivative song increases daily streaming of the re-used artist by 2.8%. These results remain robust under a matchedsample where each re-used artist is matched to one closely related control artist. Estimates from the matched-sample design suggest that re-used artists receive a 3% boost in demand on the streaming platform once their works have been re-used. I also find that low-prominence artists receive the greatest benefit from being re-used -double the baseline estimates -with the positive effects of re-use shrinking towards zero for the most prominent artists. In a similar vein, I demonstrate that this effect is most dramatic for "novel re-use," those of artists that have not been extensively sampled and/or covered. This paper makes three contributions. First, I contribute to the management of IP literature, particularly research on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Much of the work in this area has focused upon patent litigation and enforcement Schankerman, 2001, 2004; Cohen et al., 2014) . A more recent literature in this area has turned to copyright and piracy Waldfogel, 2006, 2007) , focusing on the effectiveness of copyright enforcement and new tools to combat unlicensed online copying, from government policy (Danaher et al., 2014) , to the ineffectiveness of digital rights management (DRM) (Zhang, 2016) , to online takedown procedures (Peukert et al., 2017; Reimers, 2016) , to the importance of communication on successful ex post licensing (Luo and Mortimer, 2017) . While much of the copyright literature in this area has focused on demand-side copying (e.g., digital piracy), this paper instead focuses on supply-side copying and re-use. My paper contributes to this area by informing and describing the contours where licensing can result in positive spillovers to rightsholders' past catalogs of IPR, versus when downstream re-use instead results in cannibalization of productive upstream markets.
Second, this research contributes to the growing literature on cumulative creativity. Heald (2009) examines the use of early 20th century musical compositions in late 20th/early 21st century films, and finds no significant effect of copyright protection on the propensity that a song is re-used. Subsequent work in Heald (2014) , however, suggests that a composition's inclusion in the public domain dramatically increases the chance that the song appears in a high-grossing movie. A recent stream of copyright literature focuses on cumulative creativity and the innovation process, examining the effect of copyright policies on re-use of copyrightprotected materials. Nagaraj (2017) finds that Baseball Digest content that has lapsed into the public domain is significantly more likely to be re-used on Wikipedia, an effect that is particularly pronounced for rich content like images, rather than text. Watson (2017) similarly finds that court decisions restricting digital sampling have had a negative impact on re-use in popular music, highlighting hold-up and royalty stacking mechanisms at play in licensing multiple copyrights. Gans (2015) considers a model where original content is remixed by a downstream creator, and compares outcomes under several proposed rights regimes. This paper follows the results in Gans (2015) by testing one of the key assumptions of their model -that downstream re-use harms the upstream creator's profits -finding that on average, this assumption may not hold. While empirical papers in this stream typically examine the effect of copyright protection or breadth on subsequent re-use, this paper focuses on the reverse direction by measuring the consequences of re-use on the re-used work.
Finally, the results of this paper speak directly to the policy debate regarding the balance of copyright, derivative works, and fair use. Much legal scholarship has been written about copyright and derivative works following the broad derivative work right enacted with the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976 (Goldstein, 1982) . Since the early days of digitization, legal scholars have been concerned that the rights over derivative works are overly broad, and at odds with both historical norms of appropriation in art, as well as paths offered by digital technologies (Voegtli, 1997) . While many authors have suggested that the derivative work right may be a particularly onerous restriction over the first amendment and free speech (Tushnet, 1996; Rubenfeld, 2002) , others have pointed towards broad derivative rights as a lever to prevent undue ex post competition against an artist's original creations (Abramowicz, 2005) . A more recent literature has tackled the legal challenges surrounding digital sampling itself (McLeod and DiCola, 2011) , as well as the related mashup phenomena (Menell, 2016) . Citing royalty stacking and transaction costs when multiple copyrights are sampled, these works have called for policy relief, such as compulsory licensing, to counteract the inherent transaction costs. My research contributes to this field by providing direct empirical evidence regarding the impact of derivative works on the market for the original, demonstrating that ex post competition is limited, and that derivative works may often confer a positive effect on average. This paper proceeds with a discussion of music licensing (Section 2), describes the data used (Section 3), explicates the research design and identification strategy (Section 4), reviews the results (Section 5), and ends with concluding remarks (Section 6).
Institutions of Music Licensing and Re-use
Information, a public good, is non-rival and non-excludable. In the absence of intellectual property rights (IPR), theory suggests that the threat of piracy and bootlegging may create insufficient incentives for content producers to bring new goods to market if they cannot recoup their initial sunk cost of production. Policymakers may intervene with copyright to bolster ex ante incentives, but must balance the length and breadth of rights granted with dynamic concerns for cumulative innovation, wherein new innovation builds upon prior work (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Murray and O'Mahony, 2007) . Furthermore, copyright has significantly evolved since its origins in the Statute of Anne, and in the U.S. now incorporates peculiar statutory licensing schemes, a broad restriction over re-use through "derivative works," yet allows some forms of unlicensed re-use as "fair use." In the United States, any piece of recorded music necessarily includes two separate copyrights -(1) the copyright of the sound recording, and (2) the copyright of the underlying musical composition.
Digital sampling, the practice of re-using portions of a prior sound recording in creating new works, can be traced back to the "versioning" production-style of Jamaican dub musicians that was subsequently brought to the U.S. by Jamaican-American DJ Kool Herc during the early stages of hip-hop music and culture (McLeod and DiCola, 2011) . Disc jockeys at the time used vinyl turntables to isolate, repeat, and extend portions of a song, like the "break," during a live event. As with jazz music (Phillips, 2013) , geography undoubtedly shaped the development of hip hop, but it was technology that transformed hip hop from a live, event-driven medium into a commercially potent recorded art form with the advent of the digital sampler. Diffusing in the 1980s, digital samplers allowed record producers to rapidly isolate small portions of sound recordings, store them in memory, replay, and loop over these samples. Rather than having to create a new sound de novo, record producers could select the "right" sound from a vast catalog of past recordings and inspirations. By recontextualizing past recordings in a new song, producers can give their recordings a familiar element while creating a distinctively new work, balancing the similarity-differentiation tradeoff (Askin and Mauskapf, 2017) . Prior to 1991, sampling was rampant in hip hop music, and often operated in an unauthorized, legal gray area (McLeod and DiCola, 2011; Watson, 2017) . With commercial success, the copyright infringement lawsuits inevitably followed, particularly the landmark Grand Upright Music, Ltd v. Warner Bros. Records Inc. (1991) ruling that equated sampling with theft, precipitating a rapid decrease in the use of digital sampling. Following Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (2005) , the courts have provided a bright-line rule -unauthorized sampling of a sound recording will be regarded as infringement, regardless of whether the recordings are substantially similar. 1 Although unauthorized sampling clearly still exists, major labels are wary to permit unauthorized re-use under threat of costly infringement claims, and thus new samples in popular music are cleared by negotiating a sample licensing agreement. 2 While some music licensing is highly standardized, sample licenses must be negotiated on a case by case basis. 3 Kohn and Kohn (2010) provides guidance on the contours of these deals, and this section draws heavily from the discussion therein. The most important factors in general with sample licensing are (a) who was sampled, (b) who is doing the sampling, (c) the value of the sampled work, (d) the nature of the intended re-use, and (e) the manner in which the re-use came to the rights-holder's attention.
Music publishers and songwriters, as the owners of composition rights, have typically been less tolerant of sampling than record labels. Hence, a composition license, known as a "mechanical license," must be negotiated to avoid potential infringement suits. 4 Copyright owners have a number of options to consider when they discover a downstream artist is producing, or has already distributed, music containing samples of their work. Timing is especially important due to hold-up (Williamson, 1985) , as well as the typical punitive terms demanded under post-infringement licensing. At the most basic level, the copyright owner may choose to ignore the sample, especially in cases where enforcement will not justify the costs, particularly when the re-use is minimal or the downstream artist is commercially unsuccessful. Alternatively, the copyright holder may also choose to flatly refuse a mechanical license, and forego licensing revenue, perhaps in the case that the proposed re-use results in the original work being "perverted, distorted, or travestied." 5 In the case that the rights-holder chooses to give 2 The Illegal Art label operated under blatant disregard for licensing of digital samples, with the associated mash-up artist Girl Talk achieving commercial success re-using hundreds of samples per album.
3 Examples of standardized licensing include licensing a public performance from a performance rights organization (PRO), or authorizing a cover song via a compulsory mechanical license. Note also that the statutory licensing of music compositions precludes significant alterations or transformative use, hence does not apply to digital sampling. 4 These licenses have historically, and continue to be known as "mechanical licenses" due to the then mechanical nature of early reproductions, such as piano rolls for player pianos, music boxes, and phonograph records. Piano rolls, for example, consisted of rolls of paper with perforations coding the notes of a musical composition. The rolls were fed through a player piano, which mechanically scanned the perforations to perform the composition.
5 As was the case with anecdotes in the early days of hip hop, with artists objecting to their melodies being featured in expletive-filled, anti-authority focused songs. sampling permissions, they have a number of options, (a) grant a mechanical license for a flat fee, (b) license for a royalty, (c) take a share of the new composition, along with royalties, (d) seek co-ownership in the new composition, or (e) demand full assignment of the copyright. In the most common arrangement, the rights-holder licenses the sample for a percentage below the statutory mechanical rate, while also taking a royalty share from the public performance right. However, licensor's demands typically increase with the popularity of the re-used work, especially in cases of extensive re-use.
A master use license is additionally required if a new song incorporates any portion of an existing sound recording. Upstream sound recording rights-holders begin negotiations from a substantially more powerful position compared to the composition rights-holder, given the previous discussion on de minimis use. However, record labels are more lenient with sampling than songwriters and publishers, given that a record label's own artists may engage in sampling and re-use. Again, however, the options available to a sound recording copyright holder are very similar to those of the previously discussed composition owner. When re-use is substantial and the success of the downstream work can be attributed to the sampled recording, royalty agreements are most common. 6 Sound recording royalty rates in this context typically range from 1/2 cent to 5 cents per unit, along with an upfront royalty payment.
Digital sampling's historical roots in hip hop music should influence the selection process in this study. Samples are more likely to be used downstream in hip hop music, although the practice has now become relatively common in electronic music and used to a degree in other genres as well. Furthermore, this norm of sampling in hip hop should affect the types of artists that are selected for re-use through samples, with hip hop music heavily drawing from funk, soul, R&B, and previous hip hop music to create the percussion-based "sound" of hip hop.
Sampled songs are often not especially prominent or mainstream, with many producers priding themselves on their ability to repurpose obscure, forgotten tunes. In this empirical section of this paper, I employ a matched-sample design that controls this selection process in order to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) artists.
In contrast with digital sample licensing, cover songs are covered under a statutory licensing doctrine that originated from antitrust concerns in the early 20th century player piano market. 7
Congress originally set the statutory royalty rate at 2 cents per unit, which held until 1978, and currently stands at 9.10 cents per unit, or 1.75 cents per minute per unit for songs over 5 minutes in length. The Harry Fox Agency, founded in 1927 by the National Music Publishers Association, collectively manages this licensing in the U.S. market, as well as collects and distributes royalties to member songwriters and music publishers.
The practice of creating cover versions is less tied to any specific genre than the relationship between hip hop and digital sampling. It is common, however, for cover versions to be used to adapt past compositions across genres, such as Johnny Cash's cover of Nine Inch Nail's industrial track "Hurt." Prominent early rock and roll artists, like The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, and Bob Dylan, are especially prone to be the subject of cover versions.
Data

Digital Sampling and Cover Song Data
A new, proprietary panel data-set tracking online music streaming was provided by Spotify, one of the largest online music streaming platforms with over 40 million paid subscribers.
Spotify provided a private, disaggregated data-set measuring the daily streaming demand of 7 In 1908, the United States Supreme Court, in White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, ruled that piano rolls and phonograph records were not infringing copies of musical compositions due to the opinion that humans could not read these mechanical reproductions. The AEolian Company, a manufacturer of player pianos and organs, anticipated that congress was poised to supersede the controversial Supreme Court decision through recognition of mechanical reproductions as an exclusive right of the copyright holder. In anticipation, AEolian negotiated exclusive licenses with major music publishers in order to control the mechanical reproduction rights for the majority of popular music at the time, preventing competing manufacturers from acquiring their own piano roll licenses. In response, Congress included a compulsory licensing requirement in the 1909 act, mandating that anyone had the right to a mechanical reproduction license once the reproduction right of the song had been exercised at least one time. 11,682 artists between August 1, 2015 and August 29, 2016. While song-level data may have been ideal, artist-level aggregation was required as part of the data-transfer arrangement.
The streaming sample covers 11,682 artists, consisting of 1,004 treated artists -those that were re-used in the WhoSampled data described below -and 10,678 control artists. These control artists were gathered according to Spotify's similar artist feature. For each treated artist, I collected the name and unique database identifier of each similar artist, dropping any duplicates. Upon collecting this list of artists, Spotify then provided me with daily streaming data, totaling 4,394,568 observations for 11,682 unique artists.
Data on re-use in music was collected from WhoSampled.com. WhoSampled.com is a community-driven website dedicated to sample-based music, cover songs, and remixes. Currently the largest website of this kind, WhoSampled tracks the origins of samples and cover versions used in popular music. Any of the approximately 17,000 community members of the website may upload a re-use to the database -as well, members of the community may comment on songs tracked in the database, report incorrect information, or vote on the "quality" of a particular sample, remix, or cover version. Figure 1 depicts an example of a typical sample-based song in the database, that is, a song that appropriates elements of past work.
This re-use data thus unambiguously measures a form of cumulative innovation, and I am hence able to avoid many of the known pitfalls that come with inferring knowledge flows from patent citations (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006) .
Beyond just data on who and what was re-used, the WhoSampled database also tracks data on how the content was re-used, such as what elements of the prior song were captured, as well as whether the sample appears once, or throughout the new composition. Figure 2 provides an example of this raw, detailed data that I've collected from WhoSampled. My data from WhoSampled, in aggregate, covers 358,356 cases of re-use in popular music, including cover songs, remixes, direct samples, and interpolations. 8 Such data was previous utilized in Watson (2017) to study copyright's affect on re-use and the content of new products. Upon reducing this data-set to samples and covers that occurred over the duration of my music streaming data, this data covers 2,180 re-uses, consisting of 801 cover versions, 364 interpolations, and 1,015 samples.
Additional artist attributes and measures were collected from the Spotify database. Follower counts were collected for each artist, along with detailed genre information, and data on all releases by each artist (e.g., albums, singles, compilations). Spotify tracks genres at a highly disaggregated level -artists in my data-set are tagged with several genres, covering 1,186 distinct genres in total, including examples like "funk rock," "vegan straight edge," and "quiet storm." 9 I use Spotify's release data to measure when an artist debuted -by the appearance of their first album -as well as to measure when an artist last released an album.
Due to contractual obligations, Spotify could not provide raw, uncensored streaming counts for artists at the artist-day level. Instead, Spotify provided a normalized measure of streaming demand, Streams it , created by dividing streams for artist i in time t in the U.S. market by the average artist's streams in the United States during the period. To aid interpretation of the regression results in Section 5 given this normalization, consider Equation 1 below.
ln(Streams
where Streams it is the normalized measure of streaming, equal to the count of streams for artist i in time t, l it , divided by a normalization factor, µ, in this case equal to the average artist streams during the sample period. With Equation 2 below, ln(µ) will be absorbed by the constant term α, thus δ will be interpreted as the percentage change in l it resulting from a unit-change in P ostReuse it .
to alter the sound and feel. An example of this being Dr. Dre's re-use of David McCallum's "The Edge" in "The Next Episode." 9 With vegan straight edge being a subgenre of punk rock, and quiet storm a popular form of R&B incorporating jazz and pop influences ln
Summary statistics for the combined data-set are shown in Table 1 , with variables split between re-used artists and control group artists in Table 2 . As seen in Table 1 , the outcome variable of interest, Streams it is highly skewed -while the average is 1.00 due to the normalization, Streams it reaches a maximum value of 876 for the artist Drake, implying that on the observed day t, Drake received 876 times the average listening. F ollowers i measures the number of Spotify users that have subscribed to updates for artist i, and hence is an alternative measure of popularity on the platform -that is similarly skewed, with a maximum follower count of 11 million, compared with an average of ∼ 113, 000 followers and a minimum of 0. Approximately 9% of the sample artists were treated with re-use (average of EverReused i = 0.089), a result of constructing the data-set -control artists were selected for each re-used artist from Spotify's "similar artists" feature. It is thus important to note that I am not observing the universe of artists and songs on Spotify, but rather a sub-population that is somewhat similar even before econometric matching. Table 2 splits the sample by treatment category, between those artists that are re-used (EverReused i = 1) and those that are not (EverReused = 0). From this table one can see that the re-used artists are much more popular on average. This is not particularly surprising given that digital platforms enable distribution of the "long tail" (Brynjolfsson et al., 2006) , and thus the control group will be comprised of many low-popularity artists. I discuss methods to account for this bias in Section 4.
Empirical Framework and Research Design
With regards to research design and identification for this research question, it is first useful to consider the ideal experiment used for estimating demand spillovers in re-use and derivative works. In the ideal experiment, the omnipotent econometrician would, (1) randomly select a sample of treatment songs from the population of available songs, (2) directs positive or negative spillovers to an artist's broader discography, any re-used artist's songs could not be used in the control group, or vice-versa, in order to maintain the treatment group restriction. These concerns justify conducting the analysis of potential spillovers at the artist-level, rather than a song-level analysis.
In this paper, I rely on observational data, and hence cannot turn to the random, controlled variation from an ideal experimental condition in order to identify the effect of interest.
Rather than specifying and estimating a discrete choice demand model (e.g., McFadden (1973) ; Berry et al. (1995) ), I measure the spillovers to re-use through a reduced-form, difference-indifferences design, based upon the specification shown in Equation 3.
Where Streams it is a non-negative measure of an artist i's streams in time t, X it is a vector of time-variant controls, γ t captures time period effects, ζ i an artist-specific fixed effect, and P ostReuse it = 1 for artists in the treatment group once they have been treated (re-used).
Thus δ captures the potential positive/negative spillovers that result from being re-used.
Additionally, I combine the differences-in-differences estimator above with a matchedsamples approach to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). To ensure balance between treatment and control groups, I implement matching between treatment and control artists based upon coarsened exact matching (CEM) of pre-treatment variables (Iacus et al., 2012) . I match artists based upon vintage, genre, and pre-treatment popularity. In the matching procedure, I coarsen vintage into the decade that an artist's first album was released (e.g., 1960s, 1970s, etc.) , disaggregate genre into main genre (e.g., garage rock → rock), and pre-treatment popularity into percentile rank "buckets." For each treatment artist, i, I then select a control-group artist, j, that exactly matches artist i on the coarsened variables. If many control artists exactly match artist i, the tie is broken by selecting one control from the potential controls at random. Treated artists are dropped from the matchedsample in cases where there is no exact match between the treated artist and potential control group artists.
Three variables were coarsened for use in the matching procedure -genre, vintage, and pre-treatment streaming. Each artist in the data-set is assigned, on average, 5.17 genres of the total 1,186 observed genres. Exactly matching on this highly detailed genre information thus clearly presents a dimensionality problem, as it is unlikely that any given artist will exactly match the ∼ 5 genres of a focal artist. In order to tractably match on genre, I hand-code each of the 1,186 genres into one of 18 broader genres, based upon AllMusic's genre classification. 12
The broad genres include "rock," "r&b," "jazz," "blues," "folk," "avant garde," and so on.
With this coding in hand, I then count how many times an artist is tagged with each of the broad genres, and select one genre for each artist based upon the greatest number of tags.
An artist's "vintage" is coarsened according to the date of their first album debut. For each artist in the data, I select their earliest album release -and coarsen this to the decade level.
Thus an artists that debuted in 1983 has a coarsened vintage of "1980s." Five measures of pre-treatment popularity were coarsened for the matching procedure. For each artist, rolling averages of log(streams it ) for 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100 days before day t for artist i were calculated.
The percentile rank of these measures were calculated for each day, and then coarsened into 27 "buckets," with successively tighter break points approaching the top of the distribution.
Results
Baseline Estimates
First, using an unmatched sample, I consider the average effect of being re-used on the original, underlying artist. Table 3 displays the baseline results in which the dependent variable is log(streams it ), a log-transformed measure of streaming for artist i on day t, and the main variable of interest, P ostReuse it , = 1 for re-used artists after they have been re-used. Following the previous discussion in Section 4, we can interpret the coefficient on P ostReuse it as the percent change in raw stream-counts when artist i is re-used. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
Column (1) includes no control, and implies an enormous benefit to being re-used, but does not account for treatment-selection issues, or confounding secular time trends in listening on the platform. Not controlling for these confounders would imply a 243% boost in streaming resulting from downstream re-use. Additionally, it is well established that the time lag between the release date of music and the current date has a significant impact on its popularity (Waldfogel, 2012) , thus in Column (2) (4) yields results consistent with the model lacking controls in Column (1). Finally, I include all fixed effects and control for time since last release in Column (5). This fully saturated model implies that re-use, on average, results in a 2.9% increase in streaming for the re-used artist, a result that is significant at the 5% level
To explore cover version vs digital sample heterogeneity, I restrict the treatment group to artists that were subject to re-use through cover songs, dropping those artists that were reused through downstream digital sampling. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4 .
Column (1) includes no controls, Column (2) adds a control for time since an artist's last album release, with Columns (3) and (4) alternatively controlling for artist and time fixed effects respectively. These results in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 are relatively consistent with the analogous columns in Table 3 , that is, showing a positive spillover as a result of a downstream cover version release. However, the positive effect of re-use dissappears for cover songs once both artist and time fixed effects are included in the model. Additionally, the coefficient mean estimates appears negative, translating to a 1.8% drop in listening post-reuse, though this result is not significant at typical levels. Thus if there is any negative effect from the release of cover songs, it is below the noise threshold in my sample. These results suggest that cover songs, wherein the entire composition and lyrics of a past song are re-used in a new recording, do not have a significant impact on the consumption of the re-used artist.
In light of the selection effect apparent from controlling for re-used artist-level fixed effects, I further explore this in Table 5 , where I introduce the dependent variable EverReused i , which = 1 if artist i is re-used in the data-set, and 0 otherwise. I collapse the panel to a cross section, by averaging each artists stream measure, streams it over all days, t, to yield avg(streams it ). Table 5 thus explores, with linear probability models, how artist popularity, genre, and vintage affect the propensity with which artists are re-used downstream. Column (1) includes just the streaming measure of popularity, log(avg.streams it ), as across specifications this has a small, but positive and significant effect on the propensity of re-use. Similar results are observed when I include another correlated measure of artist popularity, the log-transformed count of an artists followers, log(F ollowers i ), in Column (2). Again, popularity appears to increase the chance that an artist is subject to re-use across specifications. In Column (3) I explore the effects of artist vintage, by including a set of dummies for the decade of artist debut, with 2010 as the omitted category, with Column (5) including genre fixed effects. Interestingly, across Columns (3)-(5), we see that artists from the 1960s and 1970s are much more likely to be re-used, with results from Column (5) implying that artists from the 1960s are 7.4% more likely to be re-used, and artists from the 1970s 8.3% more likely to be re-used than artists from the 2010s. Regression results also imply that genre also plays a significant role in re-use.
Columns (6) and (7) explore this by comparing the R&B genre category against all other genres -estimates that imply R&B artists are 8.5%-9.7% more likely to be re-used than other genres of music.
I then contrast the magnitude of the treatment effect, versus the "selection effect" in Table 6 . The dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming variable. Columns (1)-
(2) include time fixed effects, while Column (3) adds vintage fixed effects, and Column (4) additionally includes genre fixed effects. The variables of interest are P ostReuse it as before, which equals 1 for re-used artists post-reuse, along with EverReused i which = 1 for artists that are part of the treatment group -those that are re-used at any point during the sample period.
The results across columns are fairly consistent, there appears to be a large, positive bias in streaming for treatment-group artists, that is, treatment group artists have a significantly higher baseline of listening as compared with artists in the control-group, and this effect is much greater in magnitude than the treatment effect, assuming exogeneity. These results are not unexpected given the procedure for constructing the unmatched-sample. Digital marketplaces and distribution platforms are known to enable the "long tail" (Brynjolfsson et al., 2006) -and a large fraction of the ∼ 10, 000 control group artists are relatively obscure acts that receive minuscule daily demand. In order to ensure comparability and balance between the re-used artists and the control artists, I then turn to a matched-sample estimator in the next section.
Matched Sample
A matched-sample, implemented as described in Section 4, was used to match each treatment artist to one closely-related control group artist. In this way, I can ensure that the treatment group and control group are not observably different ex ante, and better control for time-variant selection into treatment by matching popularity trends between treatment and control artists.
However, we trade bias for variance, as the matched-sample is reduced to 652 treatment-control pairs, compared with the approximately 11,000 artists in the unmatched sample. (day-level) of observation, but this level of disaggregation is also useful for picking up the apparent immediate effect. This graph must also be interpreted in context -the baseline estimate of re-use's effect is rather small at 3%.
The results of the baseline regression on the matched-sample are shown in Table 7 , with these results representing Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT). Column (1) regressed log(streams it ) on P ostReuse it without no controls, and shows a much more modest effect compared with the same regression on the unmatched sample in (4), with the fully saturated model in Column (5) suggesting that re-use results in an average increase in listening of 3% for re-used artists. It is important to note that this estimate is quite consistent with results from the unmatched sample, where the estimated effect was 2.8% in the fully saturated model. This consistency between unmatched/matched samples implies that time-variant selection effects are only of minor concern -most of the selection appears driven by time invariant heterogeneity in artist popularity.
Artist Prominence
With some robust evidence that re-use leads to a positive spillover of an approximate 3% boost in plays, I then explore how this effect is mediated by the prominence of an artist.
Measuring artist prominence as a function of their followers on Spotify, I create a measure prominent i , which = 1 when artist i is in the top 50% of the followers distribution, and 0 otherwise. Interacting this variable with the previously used treatment effect on the matched sample produces the results shown in Table 8 . Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 omit the artist fixed effect, and we see that these high-prominence artists receive much greater listening on average, corresponding to an over 400% increase in listening compared to artists with fewer followers. Conversely, once I introduce an artist fixed effect in Columns (3)-(5), the negative interaction between our post-treatment re-use variable and prominent i points to the moderating impact of prominence on re-use. Column (3) includes just the main treatment variable, P ostReuse it , along with the interaction effect P ostReuse it × P rominent i , without controlling for time trends, while Column (4) controls for time since last album. Columns (3) and (4) are rather consistent in inference, with a 22-23% estimated increase in listening, paired with a 4-6% negative moderating effect for high-prominence artists. In the fully saturated model, Column (5), I find that on average, the artists of low prominence receive a 6% boost in plays from being re-used, but that this effect is nearly entirely nullified for highly prominent artists, as the interaction of these effects, P ostReuse it × prominent i , is estimated at negative 5.8%. These results point to an advertising effect at play, wherein low-prominence artists benefit from the exposure of being re-used, but with the most prominent artists deriving no benefit from the exposure, having sufficiently saturated the market. On the left plot of Figure 4 , I estimate the listening trajectory for low prominence artists before and after re-use. The artist's streaming rate remains close to zero relative to the controls from 3 weeks prior up to the week of re-use, and the error bands overlapping with zero-effect show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the pre re-use trends. Thus, once conditioned on observables, the low prominence re-used and control artists display similar trends in listening up to the point of re-use. However, upon re-use, the artists immediately gain an increase in listening during the first week post re-use, and this effect remains statistically significant for four weeks after the re-use date.
These results contrast with the right-hand plot of Figure 4 , which estimates the listening trajectory for high prominence artists. Again, I find no difference in pre re-use trends between the high prominence re-used artists and the control artists. After re-use, however, the high prominence artists receive only a modest boost in listening, based upon the point estimates, with the error bars implying that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect. The point estimates then trend toward zero-effect starting at two weeks after re-use, suggesting that high prominence artists receive little, if any, positive effect from downstream re-use.
Novel Re-uses
Finally, I also explore how this effect differs for artists that have not traditionally been the target of digital sampling and cover versions. Some artists have been particularly subject to re-use, such as James Brown, The Winstons, and George Clinton's related Parliament and Funkadelic acts. 13 Instead, I look at artists that have yet to receive attention through re-use, by restricting the sample to artists that have previously been re-used one or fewer times. Of course, this restricts the sample size substantially, and the resulting sample consists of only 73 matched treatment-control pairs. While the statistical inference in this setting is limited, the results may still be provocative.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 9 . Column (1) includes no controls, Column
(2) introduces an artist fixed effect, Column (3) only time fixed effects, Column (4) includes both artist and time fixed effects, and Column (5) presents the fully saturated model including controls for time since last album. While the results are somewhat limited due to the small sample size and limited statistical power, we observe consistent trends and inference between these results in Table 9 with the previous results in Table 7 , albeit with greater magnitude in point estimates. Without controls, Column (1) suggests an insignificant effect, similar in magnitude to the same regression in Table 7 . However, once I include an artist fixed effect in Column (2), the estimate jumps to a significant 30% increase in listening as a result of re-use.
The fully saturated model in Column (5) suggests that re-use leads to a 15% boost in plays.
While that result is significant at only the 10% level, this effect is quite provocative given that it is 5 times as large as the positive spillover estimated for the more general matched-sample. If these results hold, it would suggest that less-targeted artists receive a particularly large benefit from re-use. Thus encouraging downstream re-use of both emerging acts and out-of-spotlight musicians though permissive licensing may be an effective promotional tool.
Concluding Remarks
With this research, I have found no evidence that derivative works compete with the original works that they are based upon. Instead, the release and online distribution of a derivative work induces a positive effect on demand for the underlying good. This effect is particularly pronounced for artists that have been re-used for the first time, as well as for low-prominence artists. Derivative works thus appear to have, on average, a net positive advertising effect for the work re-used. Consequently, these results contribute to the debate around the appropriate balance of rights to derivative works, aims to adapt fair use to the digital age, as well as providing quantitative evidence to content industry IPR strategy. In particular, these results speak to the potentially unexpected benefits of a permissive licensing strategy -that easing licensing terms of music publishers' and record labels' catalogs may actually drum up demand for these under-utilized works. This research additionally may inform licensing negotiations, as I've thus far seen no evidence that digital sampling and cover version licensing deals internalize this positive effect in pricing and licensing terms. That is, when an eminent artist intends to re-use a piece of music, pricing should incorporate the chance that this downstream re-use will actually boost the market for the original.
From a policy perspective, the finding of a small, positive effect from downstream re-use is particularly useful for designing the appropriate balance of copyright in a cumulative setting.
In fact, finding any non-negative effect from downstream re-use would still be policy relevant as this would imply that re-use causes no economic harm to the original artist. Evidence of these potential positive spillovers is particularly relevant to rapidly changing content industries. Particularly in the music industry, publishers and record labels face new threats from digitization. Additionally, traditional music industry strategies for promoting back catalog works, such as the n-th anniversary re-issue box set, are becoming less relevant due to digitization and the successive unbundling of content. Despite this, labels now possess a repertoire covering decades of copyrights on once-popular music, and these rights are extremely long lived -nearly all sound recordings will be protected by U.S. copyright until 2067. While labels have many avenues for promoting currently active artists -through new albums and singles, collaborations with established acts, and live tours -methods are more limited for promoting dated, now-forgotten artists. Thus, this research provides a suggestive avenue for monetizing the rights portfolio of out-of-spotlight artists, and the industry should consider supporting mechanisms to ease the transaction costs of re-use -through collective licensing and/or compulsory licensing schemes. 14 Finally, these results are also useful for adapting fair use to the digital environment. Rather uniquely, the copyright policy of the United States includes a fair use doctrine that permits legal, unauthorized use of copyright-protected material in limited contexts. 15 Fair use is determined in a case by case basis using a four factor test, with the fourth factor considering "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." I have demonstrated in this paper a context in which re-use, on average, has a positive effect on the potential market of the upstream work, speaking directly to the fourth factor of consideration under fair use. 16 As a balance to copyright's restrictions of first amendment free speech, the fair use doctrine is still quite flawed. 17 Due to the necessarily vague statute, any given fair-use case is subject to the opinions of a judge and jury, such that determining whether a use qualifies as a fair use ex ante is extremely difficult, if not impossible, even under guidance from a legal professional. In the cases that a use will be judged to fall under fair use, a successful defense of this in court is inevitably very costly. And yet, digital age policies like 'notice-and-takedown' procedures further threaten fair use with their ability to be abused to invoke censorship. This paper thus provides provocative results that contribute to the debate of how to best re-design fair use.
14 See e.g., Menell (2016) detailing how compulsory licensing could be expanded for this context 15 Israel, Poland, and South Korea current have small fair use provisions. The European Union may also be moving towards fair use style exemptions. 16 Although it is the case that the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market, includes consideration for the effect of the use upon the market for authorized derivative works. These results do not refute the relevance of this factor, but are intended to aid discussion and debate of the matter.
17 See e.g., Tushnet (2004) ; Carroll (2007) for a thorough analysis of this point. The WhoSampled.com community provides detailed re-use data for each song in their database. For the same downstream song shown in Figure 1 , details about each re-use are also collected, such as the timing and extent of re-use, and the elements of the upstream song that were re-used. This screen capture displays the raw data covering Beastie Boy's 1989 sample of Funk Factory's 1975 song "Rien Ne Va Plus" (2,650) (2,599) Note: This table displays sample means, with standard deviations in parentheses, split by re-used/control group category. The first column displays statistics (EverReused i = 0) for the control group artists, those artists that were not covered or sampled. The second column for those artists that were re-used through new cover songs or sample-based music (EverReused i = 1). Pooled statistics are displayed in the third column. Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Tables and Figures
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The treatment group is restricted to only those artists that were re-used through cover versions, not digital samples. Columns (1) and (2) include no fixed effects, with Column (2) controlling for the number of days between time t and the last album released by artist i. Column (3) adds an artist fixed effect, Column (4) includes time fixed effects in the form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. Column (5) includes both artist and time fixed effects, as well as controlling for time since last album Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: This table displays coefficients from linear probability model regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary variable, EverReused i , which = 1 if an artist is the target of re-use in my data-set, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes only log(avg.streams it ) as a regressor, while Column (2) adds log(F ollowers i ). Columns (3) and (4) include an artist's vintage,, their decade of first appearance, as explanatory variables, with the 2010's group omitted as the base factor. Column (5) additionally controls for genre fixed effects. Column (6) and (7) explore the effect of genre by comparing the R&B genre against all other genres. Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The variable P ostReuse it = 1 for artists that have been re-used. The variable EverReused i = 1 for artists that are re-used at any point during the sample period. Columns (1) and (2) include time fixed effects in the form of day-of-week and month-of-year fixed effects. Column (3) controls for time effects, as well as vintage effects -the year of an artist's debut. Column (4) controls for time, vintage, and genre. Robust standard errors, clustered at the artist level, in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: This table displays regression coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log-transformed streaming measure for artist i in time t. Linear regression is used for estimation. The sample is restricted to a matched-sample, wherein each reused artist is matched to one closely related control-group artist. The sample is further restricted to those artists that have previously been re-used one or fewer times. This procedure reduces the sample to 73 such treatment-control pairs. Column (1) contains no controls. Column (2) includes an artist fixed effect, while Column (3) contains only time fixed effects. Column (4) controls for both artist and time fixed effects, while Column (5) fully controls for artist, time, and time since last album.
